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NOTE: USING THE EMERGENT SEED TO COMPLETELY CHARACTERIZE
“EVOLUTION AND INFORMATION IN A GIFT GIVING GAME.”
KEVIN HASKER
Abstract. Let β be the ratio of beneﬁt to cost of an altruistic act controlling for trembles. In “Evolution
and Information in a Gift Giving Game” [3] the stochastically stable strategy is found if β < 2 or β > 4.I n
this note the stochastically stable strategy is found for the intermediary range and the speed of evolution is
bounded.
It is shown that if β ≤ 3 then players are selﬁsh in the long run, if β ≥ 3 then players are altruistic in
the long run and use a particularly strong strategy, called the “team” strategy.
1. Introduction
There is a fundamental underlying structure that evolution follows, called the emergent seed.I n “ E v o -
lution and Information in a Gift Giving Game” ﬁnding the emergent seed allows a simple and complete
characterization of stochastically stable strategies, and gives us the tightest known bound on the speed of
evolution.
Johnson, Levine and Pesendorfer [3] analyzed one of the most complex problems in the evolutionary
literature: when cooperation can evolve in a matching game. To ﬁnd the solution Johnson et al. used the
most advanced technique then in the literature: Ellison’s [1] radius and coradius technique. Ellison [1] shows
that when the radius of a limit set is greater than its coradius then it is stochastically stable. In Johnson et
al. this occurs when β < 2 or β > 4.
Since, to the author’s knowledge, this is the only paper other than Ellison [1] to use the radius and coradius
technique; it is natural to see how the emergent seed methodology (Hasker [2]) fared in that problem. The
emergent seed is the most likely path for evolution that includes all possible states. We say that something
is in the core of the emergent seed if wherever evolution starts, it is likely to pass through that state. In
Johnson et al. [3] all limit sets are in the core. This makes ﬁnding their stochastic potential simple since for
limit sets in the core their stochastic potential is the cost of the emergent seed minus the radius of the limit
set.
In the next section a simpliﬁed version of the model in Johnson et al. is presented along with the relevant
results about the Emergent Seed. In section 3 the strategies that are potentially stochastically stable are
identiﬁed, and then in section 4 the Emergent Seed is found and the stochastically stable strategy is identiﬁed.
2. The Model and the Emergent Seed
Players live for two periods with their lifetime utility being the sum of their utility when young and old.







There are N young people in each period and N old people who are matched by equal likelihood. Society
can enable gift giving by using social norms (Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite [4]). Every old person has
a social status, f ∈ {r,g}. Given this social status the young person follows a social standard of behavior,
a : {r,g} → {1,0}, and then the transition rule determines his social status next period τ : {r,g}×{1,0} →
{r,g}. A strategy is a pair: σ = {a,τ}.
Notice that diﬀerent people can have diﬀerent opinions about a person’s social status. There are 16
diﬀerent transition rules that represent the 16 diﬀerent ways people can think about each other. In order
to keep track of all of these possibilities, each person has a social status vector, F ∈ {r,g}
16.A g i v e n
strategy uses only Fk–the k’th element of this vector k ∈ {1,2,3,...,16}.W r i t e a(F) for a(Fk),a n d
τk (a,F)=τk (a,Fk) for a ∈ {0,1}.
A state in this model is a distribution over strategies σ and social status vectors F. The distribution over
F is secondary to our analysis. The ﬁnal distribution over F is a perturbation of the distribution from the
last period. Players will know the distribution from the last period, but do not know the ﬁnal distribution.
The ﬁnal distribution is generated from the prior one by replacing each old person’s social status vector by a
random one with probability η > 0. This means players expect to meet each of the 216 social status vectors
with positive probability. Notice that this means that controlling for these trembles the reward for giving the
gift is β ≡ (1 − η)α controlling for these trembles. We assume that β ≥ 1 and that it is a rational number.
The distribution over σ is the focus of our analysis. As in a standard evolutionary model a player changes
his strategy each period with probability τ ∈ (0,1). If he changes his strategy with probability (1 − ε) he
chooses a best response assuming the distribution over strategies remains constant in the future and that the
distribution over ﬂags is generated from the prior as discussed above. With probability ε > 0 he experiments,
or choose a strategy at random. We analyze the model as ε goes to zero.
For small enough ε w h a tm a t t e r si st h en u m b e ro fε probability events it takes to transition from one




The number of experiments needed
to transition from zt to zt+1
.






|{z0,z} ∈ Z (N)
¾
where Z (N) is the set of distributions that are feasible given N.D e n o t e− → c (z0|z) as the least cost way to
transition from z to z0 in a ﬁnite number of periods.
For small ε society will be in a limit set (ω) almost all the time. This is a set that can not be left without
experiments and if society is at some z ∈ ω then society will be at any other z0 ∈ ω\z at some time in the
future. Let the collection of limit sets be Ω. In this model all limit sets are Nash equilibria.
Young [5] shows that ω only has positive probability in the limiting distribution if it has the least cost
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ω transitions to ω,a n dω does not transition to any other limit set. Let − → c ω b et h i sc o s t ,t h i si sc a l l e dω’s
stochastic potential. A limit set is evolutionarily successful or stochastically stable if ω ∈ argminω0∈Ω − → c ω0.
Order Ω as a vector, then an arbitrary graph over Ω can be denoted as a triplet: g = {ωk,z(ωk),− → c (z (ωk)|ωk)}
|Ω|
k=1,
where z (ωk) ∈ Ω ∪∅and − → c (∅|ω)=0 .T h e n ω0 is a direct successor of ω if ω0 = z (ω),c a l lω0 a succes-
sor of ω if it is in the transitive closure of the direct successor relationship. Denote the cost of a graph as
− → c (g)=Σ
|Ω|
k=1
− → c (z (ωk)|ωk).
The emergent seed is a least cost graph such that every ω has a unique direct successor and there is an ω
which is the successor of all other ω0 ∈ Ω. Note that there is a cycle of ω’s satisfying the second part of this
deﬁnition; this substructure is the core. In general the emergent seed is found through an iterative process.
One ﬁnds the base of the emergent seed as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. The base of the emergent seed (E0)i s{ωk,z 1 (ωk),r(ωk)}
|Ω|
k=1 where r(ωk)=m i n ω0∈Ω9
− → c (ω0|ωk)
and z1 (ωk) ∈ argminω0∈Ω9
− → c (ω0|ωk).
Note that r(ω) is the radius (Ellison [1]). In this analysis the emergent seed is the base of the emergent
seed. Furthermore there are multiple emergent seeds, which simpliﬁes our analysis because every limit set
will be in the core of one of them.
Proposition 1. If ω is in the core and E = E0 ,t h e n− → c ω = − → c (E) − r(ω) .
Proof. This is an absorption tree with base ω,t h u s− → c ω ≤ − → c (E) − r(ω).S i n c ei nE0 the direct successor
of each strategy has the unconstrained minimum cost of transition − → c ω ≥ − → c (E) − r(ω).
T h e r ei sa l s oa ne l e g a n tr e p r e s e n t a t i o no ft h es p e e do fe volution based on this representation. Along with
the coradius Ellison [1] constructs the modiﬁed coradius.T h e m o d i ﬁcation is to subtract the radius of a
strategy from every transition cost. Let g(ω|ω0) be a path from ω to ω0,t h e n





[d− → c (g(ω|ω0))Ne − dr(g(ω|ω0))Ne]+dr(ω0)Ne
¶
and the expected waiting time to reach the stochastically stable strategy is bounded above by ε
−g CR(ω0).
Lemma 2. If ω is in the core and E has one level, then g CR(ω)=m a x ω0∈Ω\ω dr(ω0)Ne
Proof. This is transparent since if ω is in the core then ∀ω0 ∈ Ω\ω ming(ω|ω0) − → c (g(ω|ω0))−r(g(ω|ω0)) = 0
3. The Limit sets and Nash equilibria.
There are 64 strategies in this model, however 16 of these are the selﬁsh strategies–a(r)=a(g)=0 –and
16 more are the generous strategies–a(r)=a(g)=1 . Of the 32 remaining 16 are constructed from the
other 16 by changing the “language” of the strategy. In one group green is good–a(g)=1and a(r)=0 –
and in the other red is good (a0 (f)=1−a(f) f ∈ {r,g}). Looking at the “green” strategies (a(g)=1and
a(r)=0 ) an equilibrium must reward giving the gift to a green status player (τ (g,1) = g) and punish not
giving a gift to a green status player (τ (g,0) = r), leaving 4 strategies:
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these are all Nash equilibria when η =0but only the ﬁrst three are Nash equilibria when η > 0.W es h o w
that all of the others have a sequence of best responses that leads to the selﬁsh strategies, thus the game is
acyclic (Young [5]) and only Nash equilibria are limit sets.
Lemma 3. The only limit sets are the selﬁsh, team, weak team, and insider strategies.
Proof. First notice that the best response to a population of players using the generous strategy is the selﬁsh
strategy, since the reward is the same and the cost is lower. Furthermore the best response to a population of
selﬁsh strategies is a selﬁsh strategy since giving the gift is never rewarded. Thus without loss of generality
assume that a(g)=1and a(r)=0 .
For the team, weak team, and insider strategies when these players meet a player with the green social
status they should give a gift since this is rewarded and β ≥ 1. They should not give a gift to a red ﬂag
player because this can never increase their payoﬀ when old.
In contrast the best response to the tit-for-tat is a generous strategy, since one is always rewarded for
giving a gift, and as mentioned above the best response to this is the selﬁsh strategy. This leaves three
possible non-Nash transition rules. Either τ (g,1) = τ (g,0) ∈ {r,g} or τ (g,1) = r and τ (g,0) = g.I nb o t h
cases a selﬁsh strategy is a best response because the transition rule either ignores or punishes giving gifts
to green status players.
Thus the team, weak team, insider, and selﬁsh strategies are all limit sets. Since at any other distribution
a sequence of best responses leads to the selﬁsh strategies, the game is acyclic and these are all of the limits
sets.
4. The Emergent Seed of ‘‘Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game.’’
To ﬁn dt h ee m e r g e n ts e e dw ew i l lu s et h egain function from Johnson et al. [3]. Letting pF be the
distribution over social status vectors and pσ be the distribution over strategies the gain function is the
diﬀerence between using some strategy σi and some alternative strategy σa:
G(σi,σa,p F,p σ)=ΣF 0 [ai (F0) − aa (F0)]pF (F0)
+ΣF 0Σσ0={a0,τ0}β [(a0 (τ0 (aa (F0),F0)) − a0 (τ0 (ai (F0),F0)))]pσ (σ0)pF (F0)
The ﬁrst term, ai (F0) − aa (F0) is the ﬁrst period diﬀerence in payoﬀ and the expected consequence of this
action is the second term. To ﬁn dt h er a d i u sw ew a n tt oﬁnd the distribution over strategies that is closest
to pσ (σi)=1such that G(σi,σa,p F,p σ) ≤ 0.
Lemma 4. In the emergent seeds the direct successor of the team, weak team, and insider strategies is the
selﬁsh strategies, the direct successor of the selﬁsh strategies is either the team, weak team, or insider. The
radius of the selﬁsh strategies is 1
β,o ft h et e a mi s
β−1








Proof. In the proof assume that green is the good social status, or ai (g) ≥ ai (r).L e tG(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0
k = f)
be the gain given F0
k = f ∈ {r,g}, then clearly:
G(σi,σa,p F,p σ) ≥ min{G(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0




i σi is not a best response if the right hand side is weakly negative for some σa.T h e
distribution we will analyze will have p(σi)=1− ρ and p(˜ σ)=ρ, ˜ σ will be the invading strategy and will
n o tn e c e s s a r i l yb et h es a m ea sσa.
If σi is a selﬁsh strategy, let both σa and ˜ σ be either the team, weak team, or insider strategy. Then
without loss of generality we can let F0
k = F0
a since the selﬁsh strategy is independent of social status. Now
clearly G(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0
a = r)=0since both strategies call for the same action if the social status is r.
Then G(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0
a = g)=1− βρ and the selﬁsh strategy is a worse response than that cooperative
strategy when ρ ≥ ρ∗
g = 1
β.
From this case we can develop the key insights for the rest of the proof. First notice that if aa (F0)=
ai (F0) then this does not impact the sign of G(σi,σa,p F,p σ). Thus from now on we look at σa where
aa (f)=1− ai (f) for either f = g or f = r. We want the invading strategy to reward σa and punish σgNOTE: THE EMERGENT SEED AND “EVOLUTION AND INFORMATION...” 5
thus ˜ a(F0)=1− ai (F0), notice this implies that the invading strategy uses the same transition rule as σi
in order to be certain that ˜ a(F0)=1− ai (F0).
Given these insights if σi is the team, weak team, or insider strategy then G(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0
i = g)=−1+
β (1 − ρ)−βρand this is negative when ρ ≥ ρ∗∗
g =
β−1
2β .I faa (g)=aa (r)=0then σa is a selﬁsh strategy, and
letting P (F0
i = g) be the probability that F0
i is g then G(σi,σa,p F,p σ)=P (F0
i = g)G(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0
i = g).
This is non-negative when ρ ≥ ρ∗∗
g and a selﬁsh strategy is a best response.
W ec a nu s et h es a m em e t h o dw h e nF0
i = r,i nt h i sc a s eG(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0
i = r)=1+β (1 − ρ)V − βρ.
In this expression V = ai (τ (0,r)) − ai (τ (1,r)), or it is the reaction of σi to players taking the wrong
action at social status r. Again G(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0
i = r) is negative if ρ ≥ ρ∗
r (V )=
1+βV
(V +1)β.C o n s i d e r t h e
strategy with aa (g)=aa (r)=1(a generous strategy). If P (F0
i = r) is the probability that F0
i is r then
G(σi,σa,p F,p σ)=P (F0
i = r)G(σi,σa,p F,p σ|F0
i = r) which is non-negative if ρ ≥ ρ∗
r and thus a generous
strategy is a best response. If all players choose a generous strategy a selﬁsh strategy is the unique best
response and we are in the basin of attraction of the selﬁsh strategies.












In total there are six emergent seeds, the diﬀerence being which cooperative strategy is in the core; the
selﬁsh strategies are always in the core and must be paired with one of the six other limit sets. Since all
seven limit sets are in a core the strategy which is stochastically stable is simply the one with the highest
radius.





.I f β ≥ 3





. In the latter case players are
equally likely to use the green team and the red team strategy. If β =3then the weak team and insider
strategies are also stochastically stable.
Proof. This is immediate from Lemma 4, given Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 Note that the modiﬁed coradius
of the green team strategy is the red team strategy; thus the radius and modiﬁed coradius are the same.
In comparison Johnson, Levine, and Pesendorfer [3] ﬁnds results only if β < 2 or β > 4. One explanation
for this diﬀerence is that Johnson et al. use the radius and coradius, while our methodology naturally results
in ﬁnding the modiﬁed coradius. Ellison [1] shows that if the radius is greater than the modiﬁed coradius
then a strategy is stochastically stable. In this game this completely characterizes the result; but without
the emergent seed methodology this is not transparent.
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